July 20, 2025: China has, for decades, proclaimed its intention of making the independent island nation of Taiwan, Chinese once more. China has considered numerous attack options but so far none of them were promising enough to try. China realizes that if they attack Taiwan, they must occupy and conquer it quickly before the United States, South Korea and Japan can intervene.

China also fears a wider disruption of trade, which would be fatal for the current Communist government. The Communists remain in power because of prosperity, the result of China becoming the largest exporter in the world. If that trade were to be blockaded or sanctioned, China would have millions of bankrupt and angry Chinese to deal with. It’s situations like this that keep China from following through on its threat to conquer Taiwan.

Both China and Taiwan have problems with corruption. This makes it difficult for either country to keep secrets, like plans to attack or defend against hostile activities. China has corrupted Taiwanese security personnel as well as general officers. The infiltration extends to security agencies including the National Defense intelligence section. Military personnel are also at fault. Active duty and retired personnel with access to secrets were compromised.

That is how Taiwan monitors the extent to which China has infiltrated or hired Taiwanese gangsters and businessmen to back Chinese efforts. The criminals are in it for the money. Taiwanese businessmen are cooperating to maintain business interests in China as well as Taiwan. Smugglers are another source of information. Tens of thousands of ships doc at Taiwanese ports each year. This is how China could bring in explosives, electronics, and drones to be used to thwart efforts to defend the island against attack.

Chinese firms that own a lot of enterprises in Taiwan don’t want a war and support efforts to avoid one. Chinese entrepreneurs have far more to lose than their Taiwanese counterparts. A primary goal of a Chinese attack would be senior government officials. This is simplified by the infiltration of personnel.

There are potential solutions for all this. The government needs to improve its capabilities to keep the government operational after an attack. This includes lists of successors for important posts. There must be enough to survive heavy losses among leaders. Simulation tests must be run several times to be certain that the system works.

The defense of Taiwan from Chinese attack should include the development of plans and doctrine and not depend on rigid plans that have never been tested in training exercises. Another needed innovation is the use of enthusiastic volunteers willing to serve a military reserve. These troops would undergo some training and be ready for action. This might also include the Swiss allowing volunteers to keep their weapons at home so soldiers can go into combat within hours or minutes. Nothing surprises Chinese invaders who made it to shore than being met by armed and resolute Taiwanese infantry.

All of this can best be used with an opposition force, or OpFor to regularly practice wartime maneuvers regularly. This would ensure that plans and countermeasures are kept current and effective

China has not given up on seizing Taiwan, but they need a plan that has a high probability of working. A recent Israeli military operation against Iran provided some inspiration. On closer examination it turned out that China lacked several of the essential abilities Israeli used to make their plan work. The most important element of Israeli success was experience. China has not fought a war since 1979, when they battled veteran Vietnamese soldiers in a brief border conflict. China lost initially but later claimed they had prevailed when they warned Vietnam that they might use air strikes and a naval blockade if the Vietnamese did not let Chinese forces withdraw more or less peacefully. Not only did Israel have more experience but they had developed a network of over a hundred intelligence and sabotage operatives inside Iran. Most of these were Iranians hostile to the current religious government. China has no such network in Taiwan, but both China and Taiwan have intelligence operatives in enemy territory. Both are also hobbled by corruption within the military and government.

China thought there might be useful lessons learned from the Ukrainian drone strikes deep inside Russia. There weren’t. Ukraine had many operatives inside Russia, either ethnic Ukrainian Russian citizens or Russians angry over the futile and expensive war against Ukraine.

Taiwan is not seeking to attack China but to defend itself against Chinese invasion. In that respect Taiwan benefits from what Iran has done to recover from the devastating Israeli airstrikes. Iran has received substantial aid from Russia and China. Russia depends on Iran for supplies of cheap missiles to use against Ukraine. China obtains most of its oil imports from Iran. Taiwan has long relied on the United States to supply them with weapons. Chinese efforts to persuade or bully the Americans into halting these weapons shipments have failed. America is too powerful to bully and considers Taiwan an ally in its opposition to an aggressive China.

Taiwan does have legitimate fears of China using its growing arsenal of militarized drones to overcome Taiwanese defenses. China started the drone revolution in 2006 when a Chinese firm introduced the first of a long line of Mavic quad-copter drones. While Ukraine was a heavy user of Mavis drones, they were also building their own. Drone components are manufactured by numerous firms worldwide. When Russia persuaded China to halt drone exports to Ukraine, the Ukrainians increased local production. Many of the Ukrainian drone producers now plan to offer stiff competition for Chinese drones after the war.