Examining the Concept of the ‘Fleet in Being’

Naval history begins with battles, both for the seaman/warrior, and the historian. The former wants to learn how to win them, and the latter to understand how that magic trick is done. But what if you are the weaker side, and battle appears to be a dangerous or possibly hopeless risk? How can you use your inferior fleet to gain maximum advantage – or indeed, any advantage at all – over the enemy? You’ve got a fleet, so what to do with it? This is the origin of the concept of “fleet-in-being”.

All students of naval history are familiar with the term, but what it actually means is not so easy to define. This volume of first-class scholarly essays goes a long way to doing so. It traces the origin of the term to the Age of Sail, to Admiral Lord Torrington, victor of the Battle of Beachy Head in 1690. Then it carries the story to the nineteenth century, the period of the first great generation of naval theoreticians – Mahan, Corbett, Coulomb, Castex – and their critics, who struggle to define it and evaluate its importance. Not so easy! Victorian critics called it “a conundrum”, “a nebulous abstraction”, and “a mystical phrase…which has about as much chance of being understood by the millions as the Athanasian Creed.” (p. 95)

From the beginning, the term has had counter-intuitive aspects. Doesn’t seeking to avoid battle sap one’s courage? Isn’t imagining you can be weaker and still win foolish? Indeed, Torrington coined the term to try to explain to doubters what he was trying to achieve at Beachy Head, as explained by Dr. Andrew Lambert, distinguished student of the Age of Sail and theory of sea power, in the collection’s initial article. Torrington saw preserving his fleet would better serve to prevent a French invasion than risking its likely destruction in battle with Tourville’s superior one. The ministry, however, ordered him to fight. Torrington did so, and attacked the French very skillfully, but withdrew before they could exact disastrous losses. This “defeat” created a panic, and Torrington was subsequently tried (for his life) for his “cowardice”. But his captains unanimously supported him, and he was acquitted.

Perhaps nowhere is the issue of risking one’s fleet versus the advantages of a decisive victory more debated – for both sides – than the Battle of Jutland, as Michael Epkenhaus’ essay “The High Seas Fleet in WWI; A Fleet in Being Contrary to its Own Intentions” describes. (p. 169) The Germans certainly built their powerful fleet to deter war with England, and prepared for a particular fight in the waters of Heligoland Bight where they would have the advantages. But the British nonplussed the Germans by refusing THIS battle, in favor of a distant blockade. The German fleet, however, was perhaps too strong, and not strong enough at the same time; they were unable to give up on the chance of defeating the British by some tactical ploy for much too long. Later in the war they moved a substantial force of dreadnoughts into the Baltic to support the drive on St. Petersburg that brought the Kerensky government down, and they did consider sending battlecruisers into the Atlantic as raiders. But both meant dividing the fleet, and giving up any chance for a tactical victory over the Grand Fleet. Yet letting it sit in harbor while milking it of its best personnel for the U-Boat campaign had disastrous psychological and political consequences. Still, an overwhelming defeat at Jutland would have been a costly blow to them; but not as much as to the English, who could “have lost the war in an afternoon”.

In 1904 the Russian fleet at Port Arthur found itself in a similar position, as an unintended fleet-in-being, paralyzed by Japanese aggressiveness. The Japanese were forced by the pressure of time, before reinforcements in the form of the Baltic Fleet arrived, to operate continuously against it, with bombardments, night torpedo attacks, and blockships. Meanwhile the novel factor of moored minefields cost the Japanese heavily – two of their six irreplaceable battleships. Also holding the Japanese focus on Port Arthur permitted the Russian armored cruisers at Vladivostok to raid aggressively.

The many stimulating essays in this collection deal with many periods and nations. Including some who used their inferior fleets-in-being very skillfully. Austria-Hungary leveraged its small battle fleet very effectively in WWI, denying the Adriatic to the Allies, and enabling a very successful Mediterranean submarine campaign. Two articles describe the long Italian effort to achieve parity with the French navy and protect their long coastline. Did the American Pacific Fleet in 1941 better serve as a deterrent in its more threatening position in Hawaii, or its safer position in San Diego? “Deployments intending to deter can boomerang, eliciting the very response intended to be forestalled” (p. 384) Some topics are very familiar, such as Napoleon’s failure to leverage his large fleet strategically to achieve success. Some, like the Spanish navy’s shrewd and effective use of a small fleet during the several wars of independence in South America, are rather obscure. (Except of course to those who are familiar with Jack Aubrey’s origins as “Almirante Cochrane”!).

It is hardly possible to do justice to all the topics this collection covers, including Japanese and German naval strategy before and during WWII. But the five articles covering the US, USSR, and China during the Cold War and after are of great interest. Bruce Elleman’s article on the Chinese occupation of the Paracel Islands after 1974 shows how they were able to interfere with Soviet efforts to support Vietnam with a small naval force there – with tacit American support. The editor’s article on the Soviet Navy’s need to confine its submarine nuclear deterrent to a White Sea “bastion” to preserve it gives an example of a failed fleet-in-being. The US offensive “Maritime Strategy” of the 1980’s convinced the Soviets that their nuclear submarine deterrent was indeed indefensible, and he suggests “Perhaps this contributed to Soviet willingness to call off the Cold War”.(p. 384)

This collection will prove very, very thought provoking to both the warrior and the historian. But what about the amateur lover of naval history? (Like myself.) Too dry and scholarly? No, not really. Just start with the essays that deal with the topics you know best – the Battle of Jutland it could be – and you’ll find yourself graduating to a whole deeper level of understanding. I recently had the privilege of hearing Prof. John Nester give a talk to NYMAS on Stalin. Some of his questioners were a bit farfetched. (“Who was worse, Stalin or Trump?”). His answer was: “Read scholarly books.” And there you have it! That’s a necessary step to finding the genuine, true answers to your biggest questions – including “what’s the best use to make of an inferior fleet?”

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Our Reviewer: Robert P. Largess is the author of USS Albacore; Forerunner of the Future, and articles on the USS Triton, SS United States, the origin of the towed sonar array, and the history of Lighter-than-Air. He has contributed book reviews to ‘The Naval Historical Foundation’ (http://www.navyhistory.org) and The International Journal of Naval History (http://www.ijnhonline.org). His earlier reviews here include The Rules of the Game: Jutland and British Naval Command, King Arthur’s Wars: The Anglo-Saxon Conquest of England, Clouds above the Hill: A Historical Novel of the Russo-Japanese War, Winning a Future War: War Gaming and Victory in the Pacific War, The Fate of Rome, "Tower of Skulls", A History of the Asia-Pacific War, Volume I: From the Marco Polo Bridge Incident to the Fall of Corregidor, July 1937-May 1942, Nathaniel Lyon’s River Campaign of 1861, Korea: War without End, Exterminating ISIS, Admiral Canaris, Armies Afloat: How the Development of Amphibious Operations in Europe Helped Win World War II, The Spy in the Archive, Origins of the Cold War 1941–1949, Questioning the Carrier, and A Poisoned Chalice.

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Note: Deterrence and Denial: The Historic Power of Fleets in Being is also available in an e-edition.

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