October 30, 2025: This was a record breaking year for Ukrainian attacks on the Russian internet. There were nearly 1,500 shutdowns in July alone. Unlike earlier internet attacks, the recent Ukrainian campaign disrupted the internet in entire regions and sometimes shut it down for days, rather than just hours. Eventually Russia decided to add their own internet disruptions to prevent Russian civilians from learning just how badly their fathers, sons, brothers were doing in Ukraine. These disruptions don’t prevent friends and families from eventually finding out what happened to someone they knew was fighting in Ukraine. The delays lessened the impact of bad news. The state controlled, or supervised media, reported good news right away and delayed, diminished or hid the extent of bad news.

These attacks were an extension of the electronic warfare that was underway inside Ukraine. Attacks against Russia began right after the February 2022 invasion with efforts to disrupt Russian communications near the Ukrainian border. This was meant to interrupt Russian resupply efforts and the ability of Russian commanders to keep track of and communicate with their troops. During the first months of the war, Ukrainian forces did not need to disrupt Russian communications because Russian military radios often didn’t work at all. And instead used their cell phones which the Ukrainians happily intercepted. It wasn’t until the end of 2022 that Russia was able to provide its troops with minimally useful battlefield communications. By 2023 Russian troops had reliable battlefield communications most of the time. At that point most soldiers on both sides were stationary, facing each other over a front line that eventually grew to over a thousand kilometers long.

Another Ukrainian advantage is the SpaceX Starlink satellite network overhead. Ukrainian forces have the Starlink ground terminals which consist of a small satellite dish, controller and battery. Each of these can be carried in a soldier's backpack and set up anywhere within minutes. Russian troops, or at least headquarters units, could access Russian space satellite networks. At the start of the war these had deteriorated over the last decade to a level of barely and unreliably functioning. As the war went on Russia improved its space satellite support for the troops.

Currently Russian troops and commanders receive images of the current deployment of Ukrainian and Russian forces in Ukraine. The Americans provide the Ukrainian forces with similar and often superior support. Russian troops have also been accumulating black market Starlink equipment. SpaceX, the company that built and operates the Starlink satellite network, tries to identify the Starlink ground terminals used by Russian troops and disrupt their operation.

Meanwhile the internet disruption efforts by both sides continued. The Ukrainian have been more successful so far. Last year Ukraine carried out a surprise electronic attack on Russian internet access. This was accomplished by using the largest DDOS distributed denial of service attack ever. The attack disrupted all major Russian internet systems, including financial institutions, government networks and internet-based communications. This included messaging apps and social networks.

Earlier in 2024 the Ukrainian Blackjack internet hackers group, working in cooperation with the Ukrainian Security Service and the Defense Intelligence organization, carried out an extensive online attack on Russian networks in late 2023. This effort downloaded data on construction plans for more than 500 military bases in Russia and occupied Ukraine and erased the original Russian data files. This essential data was gone for good until there was time for it to be reconstructed. Also obtained was data on the plans and operations for Russian military headquarters at hundreds of bases. The facilities were located throughout Russia and included air-defense installations and arsenals where weapons are assembled and stored. Blackjack also stole massive amounts of data on Russian military plans and proposals as well as after-action reports on completed projects and operations. Again, all the original files were erased. The damage was restricted to assets useful to the Russian military. Outside the military there was little or no damage.

The Russians have had some success with their own internet hacks. For example, Russian hackers obtained access to surveillance cameras in the Ukrainian capital Kyiv. This enabled precise selection of targets for missile attacks. Both sides’ hackers also carry out operations in the combat zone. For example, Ukrainian hackers hacked into the encrypted video feed from Russian FPV/First Person View drones, providing the Ukrainians with real time information on where Russian troops are. FPV involves the drone operator wearing a device on their face that enables them to see what the camera on the drone sees and operate the drone using that information for surveillance to fly a drone carrying explosives into its target. The operator then takes control of another armed drone and does the same again and again. Skilled FPV drone operators are outside the combat zone and can freely move around if it is suspected that the enemy is tracking and targeting FPV drone operators. Both sides use this technology. The Russian victories used similar technology.